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Abstract

This paper discusses and reexamines Emperor Hirohito’s degree of
responsibility in Japan’s military aggression in China during the late 1920s and 1930s to
the attack on Pearl Harbor in the United States during World War II. Scholars have long
debated the extent of Hirohito’s role as a warmonger due to his ambiguous position as a
head of state and the lack of primary evidence displaying his actions and thoughts on
the war. This paper will utilize the Constitution of the Empire of Japan of 1889
(informally known as the Meiji Constitution) which delineated the emperor’s supreme
position in the government along with primary sources by Hirohito’s aides and ministers
referencing his thoughts on the war situation and Hirohito’s personal statements.
Scholars, particularly from a non-Japanese perspective, support the interpretation that
Hirohito was legally responsible for the war effort, based on the evidence of the articles
stipulating the emperor having divine authority and supreme command over the
military. In reality, his powers were limited to a ceremonial role due to the political
body structured by the oligarchs who had established the Meiji Constitution. From a
personal aspect he was opposed to Japan’s war efforts, but he was unable to use his
influence to prevent the outbreak of the war as he was compelled by his top advisors,

ministers, and military leaders to limit his role to a ceremonial one and to support the
war from a national aspect as he thought it would serve the country’s best interests.

Japanese Terminology

Genro: Elder Japanese statesmen from the Meiji period acting as advisors to the
emperor who had the authority to appoint and dismiss prime ministers. A portion of
them was responsible in establishing the Meiji Constitution.

Kodo: “Imperial way,” an ultranationalist ideology revering the emperor and advocating
his imperial rule. It became prevalent in the 1930s with the rising militarism.

Kokutai: “National essence” or “national polity.” Starting from the Meiji period, the
definition emphasized the emperor’s sovereignty and the values of an emperor-centered
state, becoming a fundamental concept in Japan’s ruling system until the surrender in
1945.

Seidan: “Imperial decision,” the decision announced by the emperor which was
considered to be sacred.

Showa tenno: “Showa emperor,” referring to Hirohito’s posthumous name. Showa is the
name of the period of Hirohito’s reign from 1926 to 1989.
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Introduction
Hirohito reigned as the 124th Emperor of Japan from 1926 to 1989, overseeing
the military aggression in China and the subsequent Pacific War against Asia and the
United States. For a long time, scholars in and out of Japan have been engaged in an
inconclusive and controversial debate on the emperor’s role in the war and whether he
should have been tried as a war criminal along with other Japanese political and military
leaders. Critics claimed Hirohito was legally responsible for initiating the war, citing the
Constitution of the Empire of Japan of 1889 (informally known as the Meiji
Constitution, and hereafter referred to as such), which articulated that the emperor had
the ruling power over the country. Furthermore, Hirohito issued an imperial decree
leading to the surrender of Japan in the Pacific War after the dropping of the two atomic
bombs and the invasion of the Soviet Union, demonstrating his ability to assert and
impose his authority. The Meiji Constitution and the imperial decree are provided as
evidence by the critics that Hirohito was the head of state and controlled the military,
portraying him as an active leader in instigating the war against China and the United
States.1
On the other hand, there are those who argued that the emperor was not
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Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: Harper Collins
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responsible, pointing out that the articles specifying the emperor’s political and military
authority in the Constitution were not fully carried out in practice, putting the emperor
in an ambiguous role as a head of state. As a result, Hirohito did not have the influential
authority to prevent military aggression in China and was unable to interfere with the
decision-making process in the government Cabinet during the diplomacy with the
United States. His recorded statements and speeches also hinted that he was against the
actions of the military and the decision to go to war with the United States.2
Using the Meiji Constitution as a framework and analyzing the primary sources
of government ministers, military leaders, and advisors highlighting their dialogues with
the emperor, I reexamine the debate and argue that while the articles in the Constitution
represented the emperor, including Hirohito, as a head of state with an active role and
decision-making authority, what happened in practice was that his imperial powers was
relegated to a ceremonial one, due to the fact that the genro intended to emphasize the
imperial rule of Japan using the emperor’s name as they controlled the governmental
bureaucracy behind the scenes. Additionally, the rise of militarism caused by acts of
insubordination in China during the 1930s overshadowed Hirohito’s assertion of his
constitutional powers. On a personal aspect, while Hirohito opposed the war efforts
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Kajiyama Shigeru, Showa tenno wo omou (Tokyo: Soushisha, 1990), 23-24.

Suhama 3

against China and the United States, he perceived that it was for the survival of the state,
served the nation’s interests and preserved the kokutai. When Hirohito became aware
that Japan was suffering more losses than gains and the war situation was not
improving, he took the initiative by issuing a decree calling for the surrender and the
end of the war.
Methodology
As this research involves the psychology behind Emperor Hirohito, primary
sources from his advisors, imperial attendants, military leaders, and ministers are used,
consisting of dialogues and statements mentioning or announced by Hirohito. As of
now, no records exist that Hirohito kept a diary or memoir, and the number of archival
sources pertaining to the emperor are extremely limited due to the restricted access
between the general public and the imperial family of Japan.3 The closest source
recording Hirohito’s statements is the Showa tenno dokuhakuroku (The Showa Emperor
Monologue) by Terasaki Hidenari, a diplomat based in the United States who acted as a
translator in Hirohito and General Douglas MacArthur’s meeting after the surrender of

3

It is not clearly known if the sources were destroyed or lost during the wartime. However,

there is a possibility that some were kept confidentially to avoid political controversies. See “Emperor
Showa wanted to express ‘deep regret’ in speech, documents reveal,” NHK-World-Japan, Jan 23, 2020,
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Japan. The monologue reveals statements and speeches made by Hirohito starting from
the 1930s, although statements referencing political and military matters are scarce.
Several secondary sources written by Japanese and non-Japanese scholars are
used to analyze how Hirohito and his decisions were interpreted and evaluated. To
better understand the context and argument of the topic, two main secondary sources in
the Japanese language are used. They are Irokawa Daikichi’s Showa-shi to tenno (The
History of Showa and the Emperor) and Kajiyama Shigeru’s Showa tenno wo omou
(Remembering Emperor Showa). A traditional theoretical framework is applied in
writing this paper to evaluate Hirohito’s thoughts behind his actions.
Literature Review
Scholarly discussions about Emperor Hirohito’s war responsibility were not
prevalent until his death in 1989. Since then, academic scholars and historians from
various backgrounds have been divided on the emperor’s role. The Western outlook
tends to be critical, with scholars arguing that Hirohito was a decisive factor in initiating
the war against China and the United States. Herbert P. Bix, one of the prominent critics
and author of Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, highlights that the emperor
was an authoritarian leader who exercised significant influence on the decision-making
process in the 1931 Manchurian Incident and the subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor,
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arguing that he had the imperial influence to prevent it.4
Others presented Hirohito’s personal statements after the war as evidence of
how he felt responsible for the conflict. In his article, “Hirohito and General Douglas
MacArthur: The First Meeting as Documented by Showa tenno jitsuroku,” Peter Mauch
shows how Hirohito confiding to his advisers and subsequently to MacArthur
expressing his guilt and the desire to take responsibility, hence acknowledging the role
he played during the war.5 Peter Li, author of In Search of Justice: Japanese War
Crimes, uses a legal framework to argue that according to the Meiji Constitution,
Hirohito possessed the imperial power to rule the country and move the military at his
will, making him accountable for the outbreak of the armed conflicts and the war crimes
that occurred. Additionally, Li analyzes Hirohito’s Imperial Rescript on Surrender in
1945 and points out that he did not express remorse or guilt over the war.6 Peter
Wetzler’s Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in

4

Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 12.
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Peter Mauch, “Hirohito and General Douglas MacArthur: The First Meeting as Documented

by Showa tenno jitsuroku,”Diplomacy & Statecraft 28, no.4 (2017): 587-588,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1386446.
6

Peter Li, “Hirohito’s War Crimes Responsibility: The Unrepentant Emperor,” in The Search of

Justice: Japanese War Crimes, ed. Peter Li (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 63-65.
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Prewar Japan shifts the focus from legal and moral responsibilities of the emperor to
the imperial household, arguing that Hirohito wanted to preserve his lineage and the
kokutai. Therefore, he participated in the decision-making process of the war efforts,
sharing a responsibility with other political and military leaders in the outbreak of war
against China and the United States.7
On the other hand, Japanese scholars leaned more toward the idea of Hirohito
having a pacifist personality who cared for his people but was forced to participate in
the war efforts. Japanese scholars Irokawa Daikichi and Kajiyama Shigeru stressed that
Hirohito, his political powers being restricted by the Meiji Constitution, was unable to
control the military due to their acts of insubordination in China. He expressed his
concerns and worries of Japan getting involved in a large-scale conflict with China and
the United States.8,9 In Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, author Noriko
Kawamura takes a more balanced approach and reassesses the two dominant positions
she considers to be exaggerated – the emperor being a pacifist constitutional monarch

7

Peter Wetzler, Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar

Japan (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998), 202.
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Irokawa Daikichi, Showa-shi to Tenno (Tokyo: Iwanami Seminar Books, 1991), 157-160.
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and an active commander during the war – arguing that Hirohito was entrapped in an
ambiguous political position which made it difficult to draw the distinction between his
personal opinions and his state decisions. Hence, Kawamura highlights that Hirohito
was neither a staunch pacifist nor an aggressive militarist.10 The historiography looks to
be an inconclusive debate between the two sides, but with the possibilities that more
sources on the emperor could be unearthed in the future, there is hope that Hirohito’s
true role in the war can be comprehended.
The Meiji Constitution
Before the American-drafted and current Constitution of 1947 (still in effect
today) that stipulated the emperor as the “symbol of the state and the unity of the
people”, the Meiji Constitution was established in 1889, using a combination of
Prussian-influences and Japanese imperial models. Several articles in the Constitution
mentioned the role of the emperor as the head of the state. They were:
Article I: “The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of
Emperors unbroken for ages eternal”.
Article III: “The Emperor is sacred and inviolable”.

10

Noriko Kawamura, Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War (Seattle: University of Washington
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Article IV: “The Emperor combined in his being the supreme rights of rule”.
Article XI: “The Emperor has the supreme command of the army and navy”.
Article XII: “The Emperor determines the organization and the peace standing of the
army and navy”.
Article XIII: “The Emperor makes war, makes peace, and conclude treaties”.11,12
These articles delineated the emperor as an influential supreme leader in managing
diplomatic relationships with other states and commander of the military. However, the
Constitution also ensured the emperor does not shoulder all of the responsibilities.
Article LV “called for the various ministers of state to advise and assist the emperor
within their respective areas of responsibility”.13 This signified that the ministers had to
reach a consensus on decision and policymaking, which would be forwarded to the
emperor who would give the green light to pass it through. Nevertheless, with the
majority of articles referring to the emperor as the supreme commander of Japan,
scholars critical of Hirohito have pointed out that he had utilized these powers to initiate

11

Wetzler, Hirohito and War, 5.

12

Li, “Hirohito’s War Crimes Responsibility”, 63.
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Wetzler, Hirohito and War, 5.
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military aggression against China and the United States.
However, what happened in practice, as it developed over the course of the
Meiji period, was rather different. The Meiji Constitution was created by the genro, and
in accordance with Article I and LV, the genro intended to stress the imperial tradition
that the state of Japan was “reigned” by the emperor eternally.14 At the same time, the
genro handled the administrative affairs of the government body not only to reduce the
emperor’s workload but also to avoid having him shoulder all the responsibilities.
Hence, the Constitution was structured in a way that leaned toward a mixture of
absolute and constitutional monarchy. As the genro became took charge of domestic and
foreign politics – some of them having a military background that gave them the
authority to mobilize troops - the emperor’s role was reduced into a passive one of not
being able to directly command the ministers or the military, but he was able to attend
and discuss political and military decisions.15 This practice demonstrated that issuing
government policies under the name of the emperor was a façade to emphasize the

14

Wetzler, Hirohito and War, 182.
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Kawamura, Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, 32.
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imperial will that sought to safeguard and serve the national interests of Japan.16
Since 1890, an imperial policy known as the Imperial Rescript on Education
was issued by Hirohito’s grandfather, Emperor Meiji, calling for the Japanese people to
serve their country and protect the emperor. The Rescript announced that “Should
emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and
maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth.”17 Along
with the imperial will, this rescript became the building block of the kokutai that
Hirohito strongly desired to preserve regardless of his personal convictions. He
associated the imperial household and the state of Japan as one entity, and if either one
collapses he perceived that it would mean the end of the country.18 In the 1930s, the
definition of kokutai was officially formalized by the Ministry of Education, who
published a booklet called Kokutai no hongi (Fundamentals of our national polity). A
revised version on the Imperial Rescript on Education, it called for Japanese citizens to

16

Wetzler, Hirohito and War, 5.
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Cabinet Office of Japan, Kyouiku ni kansuru chokugo. Japan, 1890, National Archives of

Japan Digital Archive. https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/DAS/meta/Detail_F0000000000000087481
(accessed February 11, 2020).
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“serve the emperor and to receive the emperor’s great august Will…[Japan] is a great
family nation, and the Imperial Household is the head family of the subjects and the
nucleus of national life.”19
Hence, the scholarly view of Hirohito being legally responsible for the war was
partly derived from the fact that the articles in the Constitution denoted him as a
supreme commander of the country. However, as the contradiction between theory and
practice of the Constitution has revealed, the role of supreme commander has been
misinterpreted at a face value.
The 1930s: Early Years of Reign and the Rising Military Influence
When Hirohito took the imperial throne in 1926, Japan was becoming one of the
major economic and military power states in the world along with Great Britain and the
United States.20 Since the 1890s, Japan experienced military victories over China and
Russia, becoming a colonial power by gaining Taiwan from the former and had also
annexed Korea. World War I provided Japan an opportunity to further extend its sphere
of influence into China, but its efforts were inhibited by the Allied powers. Hence, the

19

Kawamura, Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, 68.

20

Irokawa, Showa-shi to Tenno, 141.
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Japanese military devised other ways to gain control of China, causing political
tensions.21 In 1927, a year into Hirohito’s reign where he was still new to the throne,
China’s Nationalist Party led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek unified the country that
had been divided and ruled by local warlords, a situation Japan had taken advantage of.
To protect their people and interests residing in China, Japan sent troops to fight against
Chiang’s army, ushering in the series of military skirmishes that gradually culminated
into a large-scale conflict.
Also in the 1920s, Japan faced domestic difficulties and was plagued by an
economic crisis following the destruction of the capital Tokyo by the Great Kanto
Earthquake of 1923 and subsequent bank closures.22 This was aggravated by the Great
Depression beginning in 1929, when Japan’s economy, which had been heavily
dependent on imports and exports between Europe and the United States, was deeply
affected.23 As dissatisfaction toward the civilian government for being ineffective in

21

Irokawa, Showa-shi to Tenno, 146-147.
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Osanaga Kanroji, Hirohito: An Intimate Portrait of the Japanese Emperor (Los Angeles:

Gateway Publishers, 1975), 111.
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solving the nation crises surfaced, various sociopolitical groups and ideologies surfaced
to with proposed solutions to Japan crises. A debate emerged on how the kokutai should
be upheld. Nationalists conceptualized the “imperial way” - the kodo - to bring effective
reforms to the country by using the emperor’s powers. It signified the ideology that the
Empire of Japan was manifested in the emperor himself and, hence, rule with the
emphasis on Japanese traditions and moral codes by abolishing Western sociopolitical
ideologies.24 Kodo became increasingly prevalent in the military, as it sought to
displace the civilian government that had been ruling Japan in a Western-influenced
liberal approach.

These national issues created a turbulent era for Hirohito as he

observed the increasing military influence both in domestic and foreign politics.25
On a personal level, Hirohito hoped to reign over the country by leaning more
toward a constitutional monarchy and with relative peace, influenced by his 1921 trip to
Europe when he was a Crown Prince. There he witnessed the close relationship King
George V of Britain had with his citizens as well as the ruins of cities caused by the

24

Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 11-12.
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destruction of World War I.26
However, the political situation during his reign prompted him, reluctantly, to
think otherwise. As discussed previously, mentioned in the Meiji Constitution, the
emperor supposedly had supreme command over the military, but because of his
relegation to a ceremonial role contributed by Article LV stating that political duties
were to be carried out by ministers, Hirohito had no direct control of the army who were
moving at their discretion.
In 1927, a military skirmish occurred between the Japanese forces and Chiang’s
army, who had recently unified China. When Hirohito was signing an agreement
allowing Japanese troops to enter China so as to protect Japanese residents there,
Hirohito expressed concern of a possible armed conflict at a larger scale. One of
Hirohito’s imperial attendants, Osanaga Kanroji, heard from the emperor’s aide that as
Hirohito was about to sign the document, he hesitated for a while and questioned: “How
will the Japanese residents be evacuated safely? Won’t this be a repetition of the
Nikolaevsk Incident?”, referring to the 1920 Siberian expedition during the Russian
civil war that killed a large number of Japanese nationals. This episode demonstrated to

26
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Osanaga that the “mind of the emperor was always focused on the welfare of the
people.”27
A year later in 1928, a group of army officers from the Japanese Kwantung
Army, who were stationed in China, instigated an explosion as an act of insubordination
with the intention of extending Japanese influence in Northeast China. The explosion
killed the Chinese warlord Zhang Zuolin, the governor of Manchuria. Hirohito was
upset that the army had acted without the government’s permission and that requested
prime minister Tanaka Giichi investigate the incident and identify the culprits.28,29
Tanaka promised to emperor that the perpetrators would be severely punished.30
However, upon identifying the culprits, a group of military leaders and right-wing
nationalists expressed their opposition to the severity of the punishment, pressurizing
Tanaka to report to the emperor that the perpetrators’ punishments had been reduced to a

27

Osanaga, Hirohito, 111-112.
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Kojima Noboru, Tenno 2: Manshuu Jihen. vol. 2 (Tokyo: Bungeishunjuu, 1981), 52.
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lighter one.31 In response, Hirohito reprimanded Tanaka: “What you have reported to
me initially is different, isn’t it?!” He then told his imperial attendant that “I do not
understand a single thing Prime Minister Tanaka is telling me. I do not wish to hear
from him again.”32
Subsequently, Tanaka and his cabinet announced their resignation,
demonstrating how the emperor had used his imperial authority to influence the
government. Genro Saionji Kinmochi was concerned about this movement and advised
to Hirohito: “For Your Majesty to directly compel a prime minister to resign is not ideal
in accordance to the Constitution.”33 Saionji, the last surviving genro, had been an
mentor of Hirohito, teaching him the significance of upholding the imperial family and
tradition for the country.34 Heeding Saionji’s advice, Hirohito, from then on, refrained
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from voicing opinions that would significantly influence politics.35 As the ringleaders
involved in the explosion incident were let off with a light punishment, it emboldened a
portion of the military to believe they could act without permission from their
commanding officers and the emperor.36
Although Hirohito expressed his concerns whenever he was able to, the
international situation gradually escalated into a conflict that forced Hirohito to move
away from a more pacifist position. Emboldened by the assassination of Zhang Zuolin,
in 1931, officers in the Japan’s Kwantung Army, without the tacit agreement of the
generals in the Tokyo headquarters, staged an explosion - another act of insubordination
- that became a casus belli in Northeast China, known as the Manchurian Incident. In
the aftermath of the incident, the Army seized control of Manchuria and set up the
puppet state Manchukuo, which the League of Nations called an act of aggression and
refused to recognize.
Upon hearing about the incident, Hirohito sought an explanation from the
Army General Staff, asking why the army had entered Manchuria without his

35

Kajiyama, Showa tenno wo omou, 19.
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permission.37 An imperial conference consisting of the ministers discussing on the
incident was subsequently held. They reached a consensus on how the military
commands were not obeyed. The emperor reportedly stated that the government was
making the effort to quell the situation, implying his demonstration of support for the
ministers’ consensus.38,39 However, this action drew ire from a group of military
officers in the Army intending to expand their influence in China as they interpreted that
the government was attempting to sway the emperor’s opinion.40 The ministers were
prompted to prove that this was not the case. Kido Koichi, one of the ministers in the
government who later become the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the chief advisor for
Hirohito, noted in his diary that “[U]nless there is no alternative, it would be best not to
have the Emperor’s word from now.”41 The conference concluded that Hirohito was to
accept the actions of the army. Cases pursuing the relationship of the emperor and the
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(Maryland, University Publications of America, 1984), 5.
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military should be stopped so as to avoid conflict with the latter. The way the
Manchurian Incident was dealt with demonstrated how the military’s power had more
influence than the governmental Cabinet.42 From this point onward until 1945, the
military would be in control of Japan’s foreign policy; the Manchurian Incident had led
to what historian Peter Duus called the “diplomatic revolution”.43
With the chain of command between the imperial palace, government, and the
military in disorder state, some of the military officers – in another act of
insubordination - took matters in their own hands to eliminate targets who were against
the war efforts in China. On February 26, 1936, a group of nationalist army officers,
assassinated several ministers and nearly killed the prime minister. The officers
proclaimed the Showa Restoration – the aim to overthrow the current political order and
to put the emperor back into his authoritative imperial role, thereby restoring the
kokutai. They claimed to be acting for the sake of Emperor Hirohito.44 Realizing the
incident had cost the lives of prominent men and had the potential to tarnish Japan’s
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reputation in the world, Hirohito took a tougher stance on the military.45 He rebuked
Kido, “whatever [the army officers’] excuses are, I am displeased with this incident. It
has brought disgrace on the fundamental character of our kokutai [national polity].”46
Kido noted that the emperor said “Suppress the insurgents as soon as possible. Hold
your post with sincerity until peace and order are restored.”47 This exemplified
Hirohito’s use of his constitutional powers of having supreme command over the
military, although the circumstances were unconventional given that Hirohito wanted to
assure that he was not the political leader that the army officers claimed to be
advocating for.48 In addition, his vehement response to the incident portrayed his
pacifist characteristic as he did not want his country to be engaged in a civil conflict.
Hirohito told Honjo Shigeru, his chief aide-de-camp, that
the senior statesman and generals whom I have trusted the most as my hands and
feet have been killed…Their actions have violated the constitution…blackened
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the national polity (kokutai) and defiled its purity. At this time the army should
be cleansed thoroughly, and steps should be taken to prevent such a disgraceful
incident from ever occurring again.49
However, Honjo, an army officer himself and sympathetic to the incident, did not take
heed of Hirohito’s advice, maintaining the military’s status quo.50
Diplomacy with the United States
Following the outbreak of the full-scale Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and
the subsequent invasion of French Indochina in 1941 that Hirohito and the Japanese
civilian government was unable to prevent due to the results of the military skirmishes
occurring since the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the United States imposed a trade
embargo on Japan, cutting off their oil supply. Importing 80% of its oil from U.S.
owned oil companies, the embargo was to compel Japan to withdraw their troops from
China.51 During this period from 1938 to 1941, Army and Navy generals, along with
the ministers in the Cabinet, were discussing the possibility of attacking the United
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States in order to cripple the U.S. Naval fleet and morale.52
Hirohito had hoped to make peace with Great Britain and the United States, but
the intensifying war situation in China initiated by the army and exacerbated by Prime
Minister Konoe Fumimaro made it difficult for Hirohito to voice his concerns. Konoe
had escalated matters by advocating for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and
forming the one-party state of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.53 Hirohito
opposed the invasion of French Indochina, reminding Army Minister Sugiyama Hajime:
“Do not provoke an armed conflict. Prioritize efforts to settle the situation as peacefully
as possible.”54 However, knowing he could not directly intervene in the war decisions,
Hirohito started to raise concerns about Japan’s survival. He told the military
department that the French Indochina operation should be treated with caution for the
sake of national policy, and asked Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, whether the
suggestion to invade both the Soviet Union and Southeast Asia would be sustainable,
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demonstrating his priority toward the country’s interests.55,56
Hirohito remained adamant in opposing a war with the United States, and
expressed his dissatisfaction with Konoe’s diplomatic approach on negotiating with the
United States on the surface but building up the military behind the scenes. Hirohito
requested Konoe prioritize negotiations over armed conflict, but Konoe responded that
it was impossible to do so.57 Kido explained the rationale of going to war by stating
how the oil supplies in Japan would only last for another one to two years following the
embargo. Hence, he highlighted that Japan should get hold of resources in Southeast
Asia, while maintaining its peaceful relations with the United States using a strategic
approach.58
On September 6, 1941, an imperial conference was held to discuss the
directions Japan was going to take toward Great Britain and the United States,
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consisting of the decision to attack Pearl Harbor.59 A day before, Hirohito had looked
into the agenda report for the conference, remarking to Konoe that the process appeared
to be using war as a means to negotiate, and wanted to question the Army and Navy
general staffs – Sugiyama and Nagano Osami respectively - on the rationale. Konoe
reiterated that the government would engage in diplomatic negotiations, and if it failed,
they would start preparing for the war.60
Hirohito then asked Sugiyama if he was confident about being able to resolve
the war efforts against the United States. Sugiyama said he would plan to resolve in
three months. Hearing this, Hirohito probed Sugiyama: “You were the Army Minister
during the outbreak of the Second-Sino Japanese War. I remember you said it will be
resolved in a month. But it has been four years now. Why has it not concluded yet? And
on what basis do you say that you can resolve the war with the United States in three
months?”61 Sugiyama was unable to answer, and Nagano offered an explanation stating
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they would do their best to reach a negotiation, but would resort to force if diplomacy
breaks down, encouraging Hirohito to agree with the conference’s agenda. In response,
Hirohito asked: “The military command will place emphasis on the diplomacy. Is that
right?” Both of the generals replied affirmatively.62
The next day Hirohito told Kido he wanted to ask some questions in the
conference council, but Kido said that the council president would ask the crucial
questions regarding Japan’s policy to the United States, and advised the emperor there
was no need to do so, possibly reflecting a concern that Hirohito might go against the
Constitution by politically influencing the government again.63 Later that day, Kido
asked the emperor about the progress of the conference, and Hirohito replied “that the
supreme command had not answered the question of the president of the Privy Council
as to whether they were attaching importance to the diplomatic negotiations with the
U.S.A.”64 Disappointed, Hirohito recited a poem written by Emperor Meiji, his
grandfather, on the country’s predicament: “In a world where all the seas are brethren,
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why do wind and wave so stridently clash?” Then, he announced to the conference: “I
make it a rule to read this poem by Emperor Meiji every day, with the hope of emulating
his spirit of peace. However, matters have now reached this truly regrettable state.”65
This was seen from the audience in the conference as an attempt by Hirohito to stop the
outbreak of the war, portrayed in the medium of poetry to ensure he was not making
political statements to sway governmental decisions, and also to demonstrate his
hopeless appeal for peace.
Ultimately, the ambiguous power relationship between the imperial palace,
government and the military command, which resulted from the uncontrolled power the
latter had since the Manchurian Incident and the contradictory practices in the
Constitution, undermined the consensus regarding diplomacy with the United States.66
This portrayed Japan attempting to reach a negotiation with the United States on the
surface while making war preparations behind the scenes. Konoe, who took a moderate
position on the war situation, resigned as prime minister shortly thereafter due to his
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failure to keep up on the deadline for going to war.67 He was replaced by General Tojo
Hideki who had been pushing for the war efforts. With this change in leadership,
Hirohito gradually accepted the fact that Japan was preparing for war against the United
States.
On December 1, an imperial conference was held to formally declare war
against Great Britain and the United States, with Hirohito announcing the imperial order
of approval. A day before, Kido noted in his diary that “The Emperor said that, to his
great anxiety…[he had hoped] for the avoidance of war as much as possible.”68A week
later, Japanese army forces commenced the attack on Pearl Harbor, initiating war with
the United States. Osanaga noted that “when Tojo and Sugiyama reported the complete
success of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the emperor sat impassive, showing no signs of
gratification.”69 From then on to the last days of the Pacific War, the emperor made no
references to the pacificism that he had voiced before, instead focusing all he could on
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the war situation to preserve Japan.70
The Imperial Decision to Surrender and Hirohito’s Reflection
In mid-1942, following the defeat from the Battle of Midway, Japan’s military
strategy turned into a defensive one that began to favor the United States. With further
major defeats beginning in 1945 such as the Battle of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, Japan was
pushed to the losing edge of the war. A faction of the government advocated for the end
of the conflict as soon as possible. Hirohito, observing the hopeless situation his country
was entrapped in, began to voice his concerns as well.71 He told his military aide that “I
believe that this war is certainly winnable if we make our best efforts, but I am anxious
about whether or not the people will able to endure until then.”72 Kido thought the only
way for Japan to end the war was to surrender unconditionally, reporting to Hirohito on
the grave military situation and suggesting he should use his imperial authority, the
seidan, to end the war when it became necessary.73
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With the defeat of Germany in May and the Potsdam Declaration demanding
Japan’s unconditional surrender in July, Hirohito “earnestly [urged] concluding peace
with the Allies” despite the army’s insistence on fighting.74 However, as was the case
with the failed diplomacy with the United States before the war, the lack of consensus
between the military and government caused tensions and delays in the decision-making
process regarding surrender. In August 1945, the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, combined with the Soviet Union’s declaration against Japan, became the
catalyst for the ending the war.75
Hirohito, with the help of his closest advisers, required a seidan so that the
military had to obey the emperor’s orders, thereby forcing a national consensus.76 The
reason the seidan was not used to prevent the attack on Pearl Harbor was due to the fact
that the majority of the government at the time, dominated by military leaders, was
leaning toward war, and Hirohito, who was not supposed to use his personal opinions to
influence politics, agreed to it in the name of preserving the kokutai. Now that the
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kokutai was on the brink of disintegration, and with a handful of imperial and political
officials advocating for peace, the advisors used this dire predicament to turn Hirohito’s
opinion into a state decision.77 At the imperial conference on August 14, Hirohito
appealed to everyone, with tears in his eyes that “If we continue the war, Japan will be
altogether destroyed… I cannot express the sorrow I feel as I think of all who were
killed on the battlefield or in the homeland and of their bereaved families… I will do
everything in my power to help .”78
The next day, the imperial rescript on surrender was broadcast on the radio, and
for the first time, the Japanese people heard the voice of the emperor. In the broadcast,
Hirohito announced that “the war situation has not developed necessarily to Japan’s
advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her
interest…should we continue to fight, it would only result in an ultimate collapse of the
Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.”79

77

Ibid.

78

Osanaga, Hirohito, 132-133.

79

Emperor Showa, Daitoasenso shuuketsu ni kansuru shoushou. Japan, August 15, 1945,

Imperial Household Agency Official Website.
https://www.kunaicho.go.jp/kunaicho/koho/taisenkankei/syusen/pdf/syousyo.pdf (accessed February 15,
2020).

Suhama 31

When General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers who oversaw the occupation of Japan after its defeat, met with Hirohito, he was
astonished by the emperor’s willingness to take responsibility for the war. MacArthur
recalled that Hirohito told him: “I accept total responsibility for initiating the war in the
political and military aspects. I leave it up to your representative of the country to
decide on my judgment.”80 Although scholars debate the validity of the emperor’s
statements, it is likely that Hirohito did feel a sense of guilt for not being able to use his
imperial authority to prevent the military aggressions but was able to end the war.81
Tajima Michiji, one of the stewards in the Imperial Household, possessed documents on
how Hirohito wanted to express his remorse over the war to the public. Hirohito told
Tajima that “the military, the government, the public – they all have things to feel
remorse for, such as overlooking the military’s arbitrary actions.”82
Influenced by the fact that Hirohito did not act accordingly on what was
stipulated in the Meiji Constitution and his personal guilt, MacArthur decided it was
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best not to criminalize the emperor for war crimes, in addition to the reason that “his
indictment will unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese
people, the repercussions of which cannot be overestimated. He is a symbol which
unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate”.83 Hirohito was then
prompted to renounce his status as a living god and declare his humanity in his second
radio broadcast on January 1, 1946. The revised Constitution drafted by the United
States changed the emperor into a “symbol of the state and of the unity of people”,
stripping the imperial institution of political powers.
Conclusion
Due to the limited number of primary sources pertaining to Emperor Hirohito
and his course of actions during wartime, along with the inconclusive scholarly debates
which are partially clouded by political positions, the true extent of Hirohito’s
accountability might never be known. The articles written in the Meiji Constitution
portray the emperor as being legally responsible for military actions, but this paper has
demonstrated that in keeping with the pattern established by his grandfather Emperor
Meiji, Hirohito did not perform the roles to the fullest extent, contributed by the genro’s
intent to place the emperor into a de jure position. Emperor Meiji had a close working
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relationship with the genro, but most of them were gone by the time of Hirohito’s reign,
prompting Hirohito to consult with other advisors, ministers and military leaders.
Additionally, the military’s acts of insubordination in China in the 1930s emboldened
them and increased their influence in the Japanese government, weakening and
overshadowing the Cabinet’s decision-making powers. This became apparent in the
diplomacy toward the United States in 1941 where the imperial household, the
government and the military were working at odds with one another, with the military
eventually prevailing.
From a personal dimension, Hirohito had long been against the war efforts,
influenced by his tour of post-World War I Europe. However, announcing his opinions
to influence politics was deemed to be against the Constitution, and thus he had to
remain as an observer for most of the time, except during the war, so as to preserve
Japan’s kokutai. In retrospect, Hirohito expressed guilt and remorse over the war,
believing he should shoulder all the responsibilities.84
Understanding that Emperor Hirohito acted more as a ceremonial leader helps
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to reduce the biased view of him as an active warmonger. This perspective also shows
that the initiation of military aggressions was mostly attributed to the army and navy,
and to a certain extent, the government. While this is not to claim that Hirohito is
completely absolved, the unwarranted prejudice toward the Japanese imperial household
in contemporary society could be mitigated to clear the inaccurate representation of an
imperial ruler that was aggressive and warlike. Additionally, it makes the public opinion
realize that the head of state is not always necessarily the head of government, and that
the issue of accountability does not solely focus on a single leader – but must also
consider other figures or movements surrounding the leader.
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